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ABSTRACT 
The paper investigates how European welfare states respond to reform pressures 
arising from European integration. We examine the impact of two variables that 
mediate the impact of reform pressures caused by EU membership:  the extent of 
public pension provision and the number of veto points in national political 
institutions.  Our preliminary expectation is that, all else equal, member states with 
few veto points and a relatively small public pension sector are the most likely cases 
of policy change in response to Europeanization, whereas member states with a high 
number of veto points and extensive public pension commitments are the least likely 
candidates for policy change.  
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 The impact of European integration on national models of governance is a 
rapidly evolving field of interest for scholars of European politics.1 Scholars have 
shifted away from identifying the underlying dynamics of the European integration 
process to exploring the effects of EU membership on state-society relations, 
domestic policies and institutions. (Héritier et al, 2001; Cowles et al, 2001; Börzel, 
2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003).  Much of this literature focuses on direct 
pressures for national adaptation (directives, regulations, EC law) and policy areas 
that are most subject to EU influence because of the high level of EU competence (i.e. 
environmental policy).  This paper takes a different approach by analyzing both 
indirect and direct pressures for national adaptation in a policy area that is not very 
“Europeanized”: social policy.   
 Our two cases of Europeanization are the impact of EC equality law on public 
pension arrangements and the impact of the EMU convergence criterion concerning 
budget deficits on public pension arrangements. The former is a case of strong, 
binding, direct pressure for adaptation, and the latter is a case of diffuse, indirect 
pressure for domestic adaptation.  For both types of European pressure, we have 
chosen cases in which adpational pressure was significant, so that this variable is 
more or less held constant across cases.  To explain variable patterns of adaptation 
across cases, we rely on two variables central to the literature on welfare state change: 
program structure and the number of veto points.  We hypothesize that countries with 
low levels of public pension provision and few veto points are the most likely cases of 
substantial policy change in response to European pressures.  Conversely, countries 
with many veto points and extensive public pension commitments are the least likely 
candidates for policy change, even when European pressures are strong.   
 The paper begins with a brief discussion of both the Europeanization and 
welfare state literatures.  We then describe our explanatory model based on program 
structure and veto points. The next two sections test the model for Belgian and Dutch 
adaptation to the EC directive on equality in public pension schemes and Italian and 
Belgian adaptation to the Maastricht budget deficit target of 3% which involved 
significant pension reforms in both countries.  We conclude with a discussion of the 
implications of our analysis for the Europeanization literature. 
                                                 
1  Note that, at the same time, the expanding field of comparative political economcy (Scharpf, 1997; 
Kitschelt et al, 1999; Schmidt, 2002) has examined the difficulties of European welfare states in the 
face of European economic integration and has generated the insight that different models of politico-
economic governance respond differently to the common challenge of economic liberalization.   
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The Europeanization Literature 
 Europeanization is a ‘highly contested concept’ (Kassim et al. 2000: 235).  
Recent studies (Olsen, 2002; Featherstone and Radaelli, 2003; Buller and Gamble, 
2004) identify a number of understandings: Europeanization as the development of 
institutions of governance at the European level (Cowles et al, 2001); Europeanization 
as the end goal of political unification in Europe; Europeanization as European form 
of organization and governance being exported outside Europe; Europeanization as a 
process in which domestic politics becomes increasingly subjected to European 
policy-making; and Europeanization as a ‘smokescreen for domestic policy 
maneuvers’ (Buller and Gamble, 2004). This study follows Cowles et al (2001) 
understanding of Europeanization as a ‘process by which distinct structures of 
governance at the European level affect domestic structures and domestic politics’. 
Europeanization, here, highlights the role of European politics and institutions as an 
independent variable in domestic politics, and it refers to the processes by which 
domestic structures adapted to European integration.  
Member states respond differently to European top-down pressures. 2 There is 
an ongoing discussion on the determinants of national adaptations to EU legislation 
and on the variation in national adjustment to and implementation of EU directives. 
Scholars have discussed the institutional ‘fit’, i.e. the compability of national and 
European policies and institutions, and found a strong causal relationship between the 
degree of match or mismatch and the domestic implementing performance (Börzel, 
1999; 2002; Duina, 1997; Knill and Lenschow, 1998; 1999; Risse, Green and Cowles, 
2001). Studies covering various policy areas have extensively tried to show that 
questions of fit of national institutions and policies could explain both the speed and 
quality of the domestic implementation of EU rules and the ways, means, problems 
and conflicts of national adjustment to European rules.  
The goodness of fit hypothesis focuses on the degree of adaptational pressures 
on national structures and policies generated by the ‘fit’ between existing national and 
new European rules. A better fit exerts less pressure to change on domestic policies, 
structures or processes than a bad fit, which requires more changes to national 
legislation.. Thus, ‘the extent and type of policy change which takes place in a 
                                                 
2 Natali (2004) analyses the Italian pension reform process in Italy in the early 1990s and concludes 
that we need to apply a bottom-up perspective to access the Euorpeanization of Italian policy-making. 
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member state depends […] on the extent of legal adjustment that a country would 
have to achieve in order to close the gap between existing national policies and 
European integration’ (Héritier, 1997: 539f.). The underlying assumption is that 
national resistance is often stimulated by poor policy fit between EU legislation and 
existing national structures: the greater the misfit between EU and national policies, 
the bigger the struggles will be to achieve correct and timely implementation. 
Conversely, when European rules demand only minor domestic policy modifications, 
thus not challenging traditional positions of institutional equilibria, it is unlikely that 
implementation will cause great problems.  
 The empirical results for the goodness of fit hypothesis, however, have been 
mixed (Mastenbroek and Kaeding, mimeo). By itself, the hypothesis does not 
adequately explain Europeanization results. In response, some scholars have proposed 
alternative explanations, such as institutional veto points (Haverland, 2000), or 
governments’ party political preferences (Treib, 2003). Haverland’s (2000) studies on 
the implementation of the Packaging Waste Directive indicates that it is national 
institutional veto points to European initiatives which determine the speed and quality 
of implementation irrespective of the policy fit between national and European 
legislation.  
We agree with the central insight of this literature that European integration 
unleashes pressures for change that are mediated by domestic institutions and the 
domestic distribution of political resources.  However, we want to go a step further by 
explicitly linking arguments about Europeanization to the broader literature in 
comparative politics and welfare state change.  In our view, Europeanization is 
broadly similar to other pressures for change and can be analyzed as such (see 
Anderson 2002).  In other words, national responses to adaptational pressure are 
likely to be the result of political bargaining among actors with unequal resources 
within defined institutional settings, just as most other domestic political issues are.   
 
The Welfare State Literature 
 The mainstream institutional literature on comparative welfare state 
development emphasizes three variables for explaining policy change:  the structure 
of political institutions; the balance of power among social groups; and the political 
effects of program structure.  We will discuss each in turn. 
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 The structure of political institutions:  The central claim of arguments about 
the impact of institutions is that institutions provide the ‘rules of the game’ for 
political bargaining (Steinmo, Thelen, and Longstreth 1992; Hall 199x; Immergut 
1992).  Rather than classifying political systems as parliamentary or presidential, 
much current research attempts to view political systems in terms of ‘veto points’ 
(Immergut) or ‘veto players’ (Tsebelis).  The key argument here is that national 
political institutions provide the context for political bargaining and policy-making.  
Political institutions do not determine outcomes; rather they shape the way the 
political game is played.  This includes the manner of interest group access to the 
political process and how political actors define their interests.  Policymaking requires 
that proposed legislation pass through several stages during which various political 
groups can try to block the proposed legislation or demand changes in content.  The 
more veto points in the legislative process, the more likely legislation is to fail or be 
diluted because more political actors (interest groups; political parties; intra-party 
factions; the public in the case of referendum, etc.) have access to the decision-
making process (Immergut 1992).    
 A central element of institutionalist analysis is the distribution of political 
power.   Political institutions magnify and/or refract the strength of different political 
groupings. And political institutions provide different kinds of opportunities for 
influencing policy.  As noted, institutions do not predict outcomes; rather, they 
channel political struggles in particular directions.   
 Program Structure and Policy Feedback Effects.  The central insight of the 
‘new politics of the welfare state’ literature is that the structure of existing welfare 
state programs influences the preferences and resources of political actors.  Paul 
Pierson (1994) argues that the politics of retrenchment is very different from the 
dynamics of welfare state expansion.  Whereas expansion policies are generally 
popular, retrenchment initiatives usually provoke public opposition.  Thus 
retrenchment is politically difficult, largely because of the mobilizing potential of 
interest groups and policy advocates that previous policies helped to create.  The 
central claim of Pierson's new politics thesis is that retrenchment is a "distinctive and 
difficult enterprise" that is likely to involve political dynamics fundamentally different 
from those associated with welfare state expansion.  Thus retrenchment involves a 
politics of "blame avoidance" rather than the "credit claiming" that characterizes the 
extension of welfare state policies.  The upshot of the argument is that retrenchment is 
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successful only when politicians are able to devise strategies that minimize popular 
opposition to proposed policy changes.  Thus the new politics thesis portrays 
retrenchment as a politically risky process (Pierson, 1994, pp. 1-2). 
 How does this basic insight apply to pensions?  As Myles and Pierson (2001) 
argue, pensions are a classic case of path dependent change. Because pensions usually 
entail long-term, costly benefit commitments to large groups of voters, the structure of 
existing policies seriously constrains the prospects for reform. Moreover, the groups 
with a large stake in existing policies have an important impact on reform, not least 
because of the enormous political risks involved in scaling back and/or re-organizing 
pension arrangements (Pierson 1994; Weaver and Pierson 1993).  
 What does all of this tell us about the domestic variables that mediate 
adaptational pressures emanating from Europeanization?  First, we know that political 
systems characterized by multiple veto points, or to use Tsebelis' terminology, 
political systems that empower multiple veto players, tend to reinforce the policy 
status quo.  In other words, the more veto points there are, the more stable policy is.  
Table one provides a ranking of West European political systems that roughly follows 
the arguments laid out by Immergut and Tsebelis.  Here, potential veto points are 
political parties (if there are multiparty coalitions); interest groups; second chambers 
of parliament; and subnational government units.  While not a perfect measure of veto 
points, Colomer's 'institutional pluralism' rankings roughly approximate what we are 
emphasizing: the number of blocking opportunities provided by the political system 
and interest group structure.  We use Colomer's pluralism index as a rough equivalent 
of 'veto opportunities."  The higher the value on this index, the higher the number of 
veto opportunities.  This means Germany ranks highest in terms of veto points, and 
the UK and Greece rank lowest.  German institutions thus favor the status quo, while 
British and Greek institutions provide more opportunities for changing the policy 
status quo. 
  
 
 
0 
 
Table 1: Institutional pluralism in the Union’s member states  
 Party system Bicameralism President elected Decentralization Colomer 
index 
One-party 
cabinets 
(%) 
Veto players 
(Tsebelis) 
1980s 
Veto players 
(Tsebelis) 
1990s 
 
Germany 0 2 0 2 4 1.7 3 2 Germany 
Spain 0 1 0 2 3 100.0 1 1 Spain 
Finland 2 0 1 0 3 10.9 4 4 Finland 
Austria 1 1 1 1 3 33.8 2 2 Austria 
Belgium 2 1 0 0 3 8.3 4 4 Belgium 
Denmark 2 0 0 0 2 42.9 1 2 Denmark 
Italy 0 1 0 1 2 10.3 4-5 5 Italy 
France 1 1 1 0 2 53.1 2 2 France 
Netherlands 1 1 0 0 2 0.0 4 2-3 Netherlands
Portugal 1 0 1 0 1 43.0 2 1 Portugal 
Sweden 1 0 0 0 1 70.4 1 1 Sweden 
Ireland 0 1 1 0 1 53.9 1 2 Ireland 
United 
Kingdom 
0 1 0 0 1 100.0 1 1 United 
Kingdom 
Greece 0 0 0 0 0 96.4   Greece 
Source: Colomer (1996: 13); party system: measured by the effective number of parties; bicameralism: two points to symmetrical bicameralism; one point to semi-presidentialism; no points to 
parliamentarism; president elected: one point to semi-presidentialism; no points to parliamentarism; decentralization: measured by the proportion of public expenditure in the hand of regional governments 
(R): two points to R>20%; one point to 20%>R>10%; no points to R<10%. Lijpart (1999: 110) one-party cabinets (%): propotions of time during which one-party cabinets were in power. Tsebelis 
(UCLA website) veto players. 
 
 
 
 
 Turning to our program structure variable, we know that two characteristics of 
pension schemes are important for understanding the dynamics of policy change.  
First, the maturity of pension schemes is crucial. Myles and Pierson (2001) argue that 
the maturity of a public pension system is a critical variable influencing reform 
outcomes; the longer a country has had a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension system in 
place, the more difficult it is to reduce or privatize public pension commitments.  
Large, PAYG public pension schemes that cover all or most of the workforce generate 
commitments over many decades that are similar to property rights.  In order for 
cutbacks or privatization to be possible, current workers would have to pay twice: 
once for current pensioners in the public scheme and a second time for their own 
private pensions. Because the political costs of such a strategy are exceedingly high, 
major cutbacks or full-scale privatization of public PAYG pensions is nearly 
impossible. 
 For countries with mature, PAYG public pension schemes (Germany, Sweden, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands), past policies are highly constraining; policymakers 
and affected social interests make their policy choices in a context in which large 
scale cutbacks and/or privatization is nearly impossible.  The main options available 
are "parametric" reforms that introduce changes within the existing public pension 
structure.  For example, benefit formulae can be made less generous, contributions 
can be raised, partial privatization can be introduced to supplement public benefits 
etc. 
 A second group of countries did not legislate earnings-related, PAYG public 
pensions during the decades immediately following World War II.  This cluster 
includes Denmark, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the Southern European welfare 
states.  Here there is usually a basic form of public provision, and earnings-related 
benefits are organized collectively, usually as occupational pensions negotiated as part 
of collective wage agreements (Myles and Pierson 2001).  Although earnings-related 
pensions are organized by the market and not the state, the role of the state is still 
crucial in terms of regulation.  For example, the Dutch regulatory framework 
establishes rules for investment and capital coverage, and the Ministry of Social 
Affairs can extend mandatory pension provision to entire sectors and branches in the 
economy.  The result is a coverage level of about 92% (SER 2001).  However, the 
provisions of specific pension schemes (premiums; benefit formula, indexing etc) are 
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left to corporatist pension fund boards.  In Switzerland, regulation appears even 
tougher; state regulation mandates a minimum rate of return, for example (Bonoli 
2003). 
The second aspect of program structure is closely related to the first: the size 
of the public pension schemes relative to private schemes, as well as their maturity.  
Basically, the argument here is that where mature public pension schemes dominate 
retirement provision, voters (both current workers and current pensioners) have a 
large stake in the status quo because public pensions are or will be the main source of 
their retirement income.  This means that the stickiness of the status quo should be 
stronger in countries like Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Belgium, which all have 
comprehensive, mature, public pension schemes and relatively small or even 
insignificant private/occupational pension schemes.  In contrast, countries like the 
Netherlands, Denmark and the UK have large private/occupational pension sectors 
(see table 2).  These countries also have significant basic public pensions (less true for 
the UK), but about half to one third of retirement income comes from occupational 
pensions, so the status quo should less sticky because pensioners have other sources 
of income besides the public pensions. 
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               Table 2: public/private mix in pensions 
 share of public pensions in 
retirement income  %* 1998 
Italy 48.5** 
Germany 81.9 
Sweden 71.1 
France 68.3 
Belgium data not available 
Netherlands 63.3 
United 
Kingdom 
60.8 
  *source is Axel Börsch-Supan and Anette Reil-Held, Retirement Income:  
  Level, Risk and Subsitution among Income Components. 
   OECD Working Paper AWP 3.7. table 2.  
  **Amazingly enough, many Italians past retirement age still work;  
  income from earnings accounts for 27.2% of income in retirement,  
  and asset income is 24.3%.  Few have private pensions. 
 
 Table 3 summarizes the basic argument: member states with few veto points 
and relatively small public pension sectors (defined in terms of maturity and size 
relative to private and occupational pensions) are expected to be the most likely cases 
of policy change in the face of adaptational pressures from Europe.  Countries with a 
high number of veto points and large public pension sectors are expected to be the 
least likely candidates for policy change.  Countries with either many veto points and 
a small public pension sector OR few veto points and a large public pension system 
are expected to fall between these two extremes. 
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Table 3: a crude model of factors influencing the likelihood of policy change 
  
Veto points  
low high 
 
low 
substantial change 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
 
Portugal 
 
 
←Spain** 
 
Extent of 
public 
provision 
 
high 
 
Sweden 
        little change     
             
             Germany 
             Belgium 
←Italy* 
 
*Italy is difficult to classify because veto points are not as numerous  
as in Germany and Belgium. 
**Spain is also difficult to classify for the same reason; Spanish public pensions  
are not extensive in absolute terms, but relative to private and occupational pensions they are. 
 
 
Adaptation to European Pressures for Change 
A) Belgium, the Netherlands, and the implementation of EC Directive 79/7/EEC 
 In 1978, the Council adopted a directive requiring the member states to 
remove all provisions in statutory social security schemes that violated the principle 
of equal treatment between men and women.  The directive prohibited member states 
from discriminating in terms of access, the calculation and payment of contributions, 
and the calculation of benefits. The directive created substantial adaptational pressure 
for member states with ‘breadwinner’ based social security schemes that excluded 
married women (because a breadwinner benefit was available only to the husband) or 
unmarried women (because the assumption was that they would get married at some 
later point and benefit from their husbands’ benefits).  The deadline for transposition 
was December 19, 1985.  
 Here we look at two cases in which adaptational pressure was high because 
public pensions were organized on the breadwinner principle (Netherlands) or 
because pension rules were different for men and women (Belgium).  We assume that 
adaptational pressure is held constant, so the main difference between the two cases is 
that the Netherlands is a case of ‘likely change’ because of few veto points/small 
public pension sector and Belgium is expected to be a case of ‘limited change’ 
because of multiple veto points and an extensive public pension scheme.  
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Belgium3
 The Belgian political systems is full of veto points because of federalism, a 
strong linguistic cleavage, and a multiparty system.  Public pension provision 
dominates; the occupational pension system is relatively underdeveloped and only the 
affluent have access to private pensions.  This means that organized interests with a 
stake in the status quo have strong preferences, and the political decision-making 
system offers many opportunities for blocking legislation. 
 Belgium was slow to implement the changes that Directive 79/7 EEC seemed 
to require.  Even after the 1985 transposition deadline had passed, Belgium still had 
legislation in place that included different benefit formulae for men and women, and 
different retirement ages.4  For example, there were different contribution bases (40 
for women, 45 for men) for men and women, and different retirement ages. It was 
only a matter of time before the European Commission sued Belgium in the ECJ 
concerning these provisions.   
 Belgium failed to tranpose on time, and the ECJ found Belgium in violation of 
EC law in 1986.  The Christian Democratic/Liberal government responded by trying 
to harmonize retirement ages for men and women as part of its "St. Anna Plan," a 
package of budget consolidation measures. Discussion focused on whether to increase 
womens’ retirement age to 65 or lower men's to 60.  Unions fiercely opposed a higher 
retirement age, and when the government consulted the social partners through the 
NAR (institutionalized bipartite council for negotiation which needs to be consulted 
on social reforms), the NAR (including the employers) unanimously rejected raising 
the retirement age. The NAR argued that because of the high benefit dependency 
among employees older than 50, the postponed retirement age (65 instead of 60) 
would lead to deficits in other social benefit schemes, which were more expensive 
than the pension scheme. 
The socialist trade union FGTB/ABVV organized massive protest actions as 
soon as the St. Anna plan became public (23 May 1986).  The Christian trade union 
ACV/CSC called the plan ‘unacceptable’ and insisted that the government reconsider 
it and start negotiations with the social partners.  When the government proposed 
minor adjustments to the St. Anna plan in June, the unions were not satisfied.  Another 
round of negotiation led to more adjustments (such as postponing the decision on 
                                                 
3 This section draws extensively on Anderson et al. (2007) 
4 We still need information on whether Belgium did anything by 1985 to transpose the directive. 
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statutory retirement age) but there was still no consensus.  The unions abandoned their 
strikes in the summer, and on 16 July 1986 the government enacted the St. Anna Plan 
in a series of Royal Decrees (see B.S. July 30, 1986).  The question of the equalization 
of retirement ages was not solved, however, and it would remain on the decision 
agenda for the next ten years.   
 The issue lay dormant until 1990, when the introduction of unisex rules for a 
flexible retirement age in 1990 was intended to head off another challenge by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) to Belgian pension law.  In 1990, the government 
introduced flexible retirement age that meant that the retirement age for men and 
women was de facto equal.  However, the benefit formula was still different for men 
and women (40 years of contributions for women and 45 years for men).  This was 
considered discriminatory.  Belgium wanted to keep the lower number of contribution 
years for women, but financial concerns meant that Belgium could not afford to apply 
this rule to men.  The Minister of Pensions insisted publicly that the 1990 legislation 
solved the problem, but there was much speculation in the press that Belgian pension 
law still violated the directive.  In July 1993 the European Court ruled that Belgian 
pension rules did not comply with the principle of equal treatment in social security 
and instructed Belgium to change its law and practice (Le Soir, January 6, 1995). 
 The law of June 19, 1996 'tot interpretatie van de wet van 20 juli 1990"  
introduced a temporary solution to the equal treatment issue in anticipation of a more 
permanent reform.  This issue was part of the discussion of pension reform at the 
Hertoginnedal-convention concerning the budget in 1997.  The government agreed to 
gradually raise women's retirement age to 65 starting in 1997 so that by 2009 the 
retirement age is 65.  Every three years it goes up by one year.  In order to minimize 
negative effects, the rules for the minimum pension were relaxed somewhat.    
 To summarize, Belgian adaption to Directive 77/7/EEC was extremely slow, 
incorrect, and incomplete.  Only after the ECJ found Belgium in violation of EC law 
twice, was the government able to introduce the necessary changes.  It seems obvious 
that the multiple veto points in the Belgian political system provided opportunities for 
opponents to block policy change.  And given the importance of the public pension in 
the retirement packages of most Belgian women, there was massive opposition.  
Unions promoted the cause of women and prevented two governments from making 
their planned changes. 
Netherlands 
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 Dutch political decision-making institutions are relatively centralized but the 
multiparty system produces multiparty cabinets.  However, the Netherlands scores 
high on the Colomer scale, so we classify it as having few veto points.  The Dutch 
public pension system only provides a flat-rate (but relatively generous) benefit, and 
mandated occupational pensions provide the rest of retirement income.  The public 
pension (AOW) provides about half of retirement income and occupational pensions 
and private pensions provide the rest.  The low number of veto points and the 
relatively small size of the public pension sector make the Netherlands a case of 
‘likely” policy change. 
 The structure of the Dutch public pension scheme, like the Belgian, conflicted 
with the provisions of Directive 79/7/EEC.  Since its establishment in 1957, the AOW 
was based on the breadwinner principle.  Married women did not receive their own, 
individual benefit; instead, the husband received a benefit intended for both spouses.  
Unmarried women (and men) over 65 did receive an individual benefit.  Similarly, the 
structure of AOW financing was based on the single breadwinner principle; only the 
main breadwinner paid contributions, even if the spouse was employed.  These 
provisions directly conflicted with European law concerning equal treatment, and the 
requirements of EU equality law have had a substantial impact on the AOW.  Starting 
in 1979, all Dutch social security schemes were adjusted to the EC equal treatment 
directive.  For the AOW system, this required the modification of existing rules 
excluding married women from eligibility.   
Before the EU directive, there was little political pressure to modify the AOW 
system in order to provide married women with individual benefits.  Because the 
AOW system provided married men a benefit that "included" a benefit for the wife, 
the system was not perceived by most to be unfair. However, when the EU issued its 
directive, Dutch policymakers changed the existing rules without protest, but the 
process took five years, and the government nearly missed the transposition deadline.  
Unlike other parts of the social insurance system that violated EU equality law (like 
unemployment insurance), modifications to the AOW system to conform to EU rules 
did not require additional AOW pension spending and did not result in direct benefit 
cuts. However, some pensioners experienced a decline in income because of the 
indirect effects of the changes.  The basic solution that the Lubbers I government 
(Christian Democrats, CDA and Liberals, VVD) settled on was to simply divide the 
AOW benefit for two spouses in half and pay an individual benefit to both the 
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husband and the wife.  For married couples over the age of 65, there was no financial 
change in the level of benefits, and the state was not required to spend additional 
money on pension benefits.  However, the issue of how to treat couples in which one 
spouse received an AOW benefit and the other was younger than 65 raised several 
difficulties (see below). 
The EC gave member states until December 17, 1984 to comply with the 
directive.  In July 1981, the State Secretary for Social Affairs and Employment asked 
the Social Economic Council (SER) for an advisory opinion on how to legislate 
changes in the AOW to conform to European law.  The cabinet had already expressed 
its preference for a new AOW benefit structure that gave single pensioners 70% of the 
current benefit for married pensioners and that divided the current benefit level in two 
for married pensioners.  For married pensioners whose spouse was younger than 65, a 
supplement would be awarded.  In its advice, the SER largely agreed with the cabinet 
and emphasized that legislative changes must not increase expenditures.  The function 
of AOW as a universal basic pension providing a minimum income in old age should 
be retained (SER 1984).   
The cabinet introduced its draft legislation in late 1984.5  There was 
substantial agreement on the main provisions of the legislation (dividing the AOW 
benefit in two for couples, etc) but the issue of AOW pensioners with a spouse 
younger than 65 led to difficult negotiations in parliament.  Under the old rules, an 
AOW pensioner received a full couple's pension even if the spouse was younger than 
65.  In order to prevent income losses for this group, the legislation included rules 
allowing a supplement for the spouse younger than 65.  The difficult issue was how to 
treat spouses younger than 65 who also had earned income.  If the younger spouse 
was not the breadwinner then she paid no AOW premiums and her husband received 
the full AOW couple's pension.  The original bill provided a 50% supplement for 
AOW pensioners supporting a spouse younger than 65.  This supplement was to be 
made dependent on the income of the younger spouse.  After opposition, the income 
test was suspended for three years (Financieele Dagblad, 19 January 1985).   
In particular, the VVD (one of the government parties) opposed income testing 
of the supplement.  The VVD proposed instead to simply award the full AOW 
pension (equal to the amount for a couple) to those with younger spouses, regardless 
                                                 
5 Legislation is Tweede Kamer 1984-85, 18515. 
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of the spouse's income.  The VVD charged that the income test would lead to 
unwanted bureaucracy, and complained that income testing violated the insurance 
principle.  The PvdA also had some reservations about the bill because it discouraged 
employment for the younger spouse.  As a short term solution the PvdA proposed a 
longer transition period (five years) during which AOW pensioners with spouses 
under 65 would receive the full couple's benefit (Financieele Dagblad, 31 January 
1985).   
In February, the CDA and PvdA cooperated on an amendment to the bill to 
deal with these issues, mainly by increasing the amount of income (of the younger 
spouse) not subject to the income test (Financieele Dagblad, 1 February 1985).  The 
VVD responded with an amendment to exempt AOW spouses younger than 57 from 
the income test, but this attempt failed because of lack of support).  On March 1 the 
Second Chamber adopted the CDA-PvdA version of the bill (Financieele Dagblad, 
March 2, 1985).6
The First Chamber nearly derailed the compromise that emerged from the 
Second Chamber.  By now, minorities in both the CDA and PvdA fractions in the 
First Chamber opposed the legislation because of the negative financial effects for 
AOW households with a spouse younger than 65 (Financieele Dagblad, 21 March 
1985).  The First Chamber finally approved the legislation. (check facts here). 
 To summarize, Dutch transposition of 79/7/EEC was slow, and the potential 
negative consequences for some households nearly prevented a compromise solution.  
Broadly speaking, the relatively low number of veto points in the Dutch system 
facilitated adaptation; interest groups did not take to the streets to protest potential 
losses for some households, as in Belgium.  Consistent with our expectations about 
the effects of program structure, politicians appeared unwilling to risk punishment by 
voters; indeed, politicians tried to find a solution that would have few if any negative 
financial consequences for voters.  However, this expectation applies to both pension 
systems dominated by public provision and systems (like the Dutch) in which public 
provision provides roughly half of retirement income.  So it is not clear how much the 
'program structure' variable explains here. 
 
                                                 
6 The final version awarded the full couple's AOW pension to the pensioner over 65 with a spouse 
under 65 without her own income.  If the younger spouse had her own income, the supplement for the 
spouse was proportionally reduced. 
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B): Budget deficit (extent of EU constraint): 
 Our second case of European pressure for reform is EMU.  In terms of fiscal 
discipline, the Maastricht convergence criteria create a powerful constraint on national 
policy choices (Moses 1996; Kurzer 1993) . Market actors use the convergence 
criteria as a critical information shortcut when they make their investment decisions 
because governments themselves use them to guide policy. And it is not only EU 
members that intended to participate in the first stage of EMU in 1999 which rely on 
the criteria; non-participating states also use the convergence criteria as a benchmark 
against which to make their own policies.7  To the extent that pension schemes are 
perceived to contribute to unacceptable budget deficits, there may be pressures for 
pension reform in order to cut costs and restore budget balance. 
 The goal of the Stability and Growth Pact adopted at the Amsterdam European 
Council in June 1997 is to prevent the occurrence of an excessive budgetary deficit in 
the euro area after the entry into force of the third stage of economic and monetary 
union. Implementation of the stability and growth pact rests primarily on two pillars: 
the principle of multilateral surveillance of budgetary positions and the excessive 
deficit procedure, defining a budgetary policy to be conducted after the changeover. 
 This type of European pressure for reform differs from the binding constraints 
of EC law.  In the run-up to EMU, the member states had to meet the Maastricht 
convergence criteria in order to 'qualify' for participation in the Eurozone, and the 3% 
budget deficit limit was a key constraint.  However, member states were free to take 
whatever measures they deemed necessary to achieve the target; they could choose 
any combination of spending cuts and tax increases, as long as the target was met.  
Our expectation here is that in the member states facing substantial pressure to cut 
deficits, pension reform should have been a natural target because pension spending is 
typically the most expensive program in public budgets.   
 We focus on two countries that faced substantial pressure to reduce their 
deficits in the run-up to EMU: Belgium, and Italy.  Both countries had deficits 
between 5 and 10% of GDP so they had a long way to go before they met the 3% 
target.  Both countries adopted ambitious plans to reduce public spending, and 
surprising, pension reform was a key goal in all three countries. 
                                                 
7 Sweden is a good example here. 
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Italy8: 
We classify the Italian political system as a case of moderately low veto 
points.  Like the Netherlands, Italy has a score of 2 on the Colomer institutional 
pluralism index.   
As we noted earlier, public pension provision dominates retirement income, 
although many over the age of 65 continue to work.  An important feature of the 
pension system was that the weaknesses of the pension system were widely 
acknowledged, and there were many calls for reform in the 1980s, but the instability 
and short-term perspective of Italian politics made reform elusive.  Of the three cases 
analysed here, Italy spends the highest proportion of GDP on pensions, and thus 
pensions have figured prominently in debates about how to restore pubic finances 
(Franco 2000).  In 1960, pension spending was 5% of GDP, and grew to 14.9% of 
GDP in 1990. By 1999, Italy was spending 15.7% of GDP on pensions. (Franco 
2000). This high level of spending, combined with low fertility and already high 
levels of public debt made for doomsday predictions about the future sustainability of 
the pension system. Pension reform was therefore the centrepiece of reforms to 
improve public finances. Pension costs endangered the capacity of Italy to meet the 
EMU public deficit requirement (table 4). 
In the 1990s, pension reform reached the top of the political agenda, for 
several reasons. First, the weaknesses of the pension system were well-known and 
there was widespread doubt that the pension system could meet its future obligations 
without massive increases in contributions. Demographic trends were predicted to 
increase spending from 14 percent of GDP in the early 1990s to 23 percent of GDP in 
2040 (Ferrera and Gualimini 2001: 205). Second, the collapse of the party system in 
the wake of political scandals created a window of opportunity for reform. Finally, the 
deadlines for achieving the EMU convergence criteria created considerable pressure 
on the Italian authorities to reduce the budget deficit, and this would require 
substantial cuts in public spending. 
The years 1992-1997 were a period of major pension reform. Reforms had 
three broad aims: cost containment, removing perverse program aspects, and reducing 
fraud and inefficiency. In 1992, the Amato government adopted the first major 
                                                 
8 This section draws heavily on Anderson 2002. 
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pension reform in decades9. The reform was aimed mostly at reducing pension 
expenditure. The reform increased the retirement age for men and women in the 
private sector by five years (to 60 for women and 65 for men), tightened rules for 
seniority pensions, increased the minimum contribution period from 15 to 20 years, 
introduced a more restrictive benefit formula (from five to ten years for the income 
reference period; for those with less than 15 years of contributions, the reference 
period was changed to lifetime earnings), introduced a shift from wage indexing to 
price indexing, and increased contributions. Most of these changes were phased in 
over several years. In addition, large temporary cuts were made by suspending the 
uprating of pensions and suspending new seniority pensions. The combined effect of 
all of these measures was the cancellation of at least one fourth of net pension 
liabilities. According to one estimate, accumulated pension liabilities decreased from 
389% of GDP to 278% of GDP. The reform also included provisions for the gradual 
harmonisation of public and private sector pensions, but it did not solve the problem 
of seniority pensions. These reforms were explicitly motivated by the desire to reduce 
budget deficits in order to meet the EMU convergence criteria. 
Union protests prevented the Berlusconi government from adopting more 
changes in 1995. After the Dini government replaced the Berlusconi government, 
another major package of reforms was adopted, which Ferrara and Gualmini (2000) 
call "revolutionary." The 1995 reform had more ambitious goals than mere cost 
containment. One goal was to stabilise pension spending as a proportion of GDP, 
remove labour market disincentives, and to reduce inequity. This included the switch 
from defined benefits to defined contributions (to take effect from 2013), the 
introduction of a flexible retirement age, standardization of public and private sector 
pension regulations, the gradual abolition of seniority pensions, and other changes 
aimed at controlling costs.  
Most analyses argue that the 1992-1995 reforms were substantially influenced 
by the EMU process. Sbragia (2001) argues that "the misfit between Italian public 
finances and the Maastricht requirements was widely considered the most significant 
in the European Union." (80) Indeed, it was widely feared that Italy would not qualify 
for the first round of EMU. Because of the very high mass and elite support for Italian 
EMU participation, the adaptational pressures from EMU were "extraordinary." 
                                                 
9 This section is based on Ferrera and Gualmini (2000) and Franco (2000). 
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(Sbragia 2001). Other analysts confirm this argument. As Ferrera and Gualmini 
(2000) put it, "The deadlines fixed at Maastricht in February 1992 forced Italy to 
make an immediate and radical effort to reform and correct its public finances in order 
to halt the growth of public debt." (204). It is worth noting that successful reform 
depended on compromise with the social partners, and reform-minded governments 
had to modify several aspects of their plans in order to gain the approval of the unions 
and employers. Moreover, the failure of the Berlusconi reforms demonstrate that the 
pressures generated by EMU were not in themselves sufficient to bring about reform. 
 
Table 4: Italy: Public Deficit (as %GDP) 
 
year public deficit as %GDP 
1993 -9.4 
1994 -9.1 
1995 -7.6 
1996 -7.1 
1997 -2.7 
1998 -2.8 
1999 -1.8 
2000 -0.3 
    source: OECD Economic Outlook. 
 
How did domestic actors and institutions influence these particular responses 
to EU pressures for financially sustainable pensions? The Italian reforms are 
substantial, even radical, attempts to cut costs, increase work incentives, and remove 
inequitable features of the pension system. Italy is the clearest case of EMU pressure 
on pension policy, but pension reform was not a foregone conclusion. Italian 
politicians faced the daunting task of legislating reform in a parliamentary setting 
known for its instability and incapacity to deliver major reform.  
The success of reform hinged on two political factors. First, EMU pressure 
helped change interests, both among the governing elite and for the social partners. 
The unions in particular were crucial players in the reform process, because their 
consent was essential for success. The desirability and potential benefits of Italian 
EMU participation (among other things) persuaded union leaders to accept reform, 
and internal union procedures helped persuade rank and file to accept reform (Baccaro 
2000). Second, the collapse of party system created an opening for reform-minded 
politicians to overcome traditional parliamentary obstacles. Italian governments 
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negotiated directly with the social partners and convinced the unions of the costs of 
non-adjustment. A growing debt burden would threaten not only EMU entry but also 
divert more and more resources from social insurance spending. Politicians convinced 
unions of the long-term advantages of sound finances, and the unions accepted 
pension cuts in order to reduce debt payments by the state. In sum, persuasion, 
supported by EMU, helped transform unions' narrow interests into encompassing 
interests. In addition, a more or less open and negotiated policy making style 
facilitated compromise and enabled political actors to overcome the electoral risks of 
pension reform. 
Belgium 
The link between pension reform in Belgium and the goal of qualifying for 
EMU is less well-known than the Italian case, but the Belgian case is strikingly 
similar to the Italian one.  In both cases, qualifying for EMU was defined as a national 
project requiring extraordinary policymaking.  To borrow from Kingdon (2003), 
EMU created a huge window for reform. 
Qualifying for EMU dominated Belgian politics in the mid-1990s.  The 
Dehaene I government (Christian Democrats and Socialists) scheduled early elections 
on May 21, 1995 “in the hope of strengthening political resolve for austere economic 
and monetary policies” (Downs 1996: 169).  It was the first election after the 
constitutional reform. New laws such as those on the reduced assembly size of 
parliament, three new regional parliaments, and separate competences between federal 
and subnational levels of government had come into force in the past period.    
When the Dehaene II cabinet took office it promised to announce the main 
features of a social security reform by the end of 1995 and to make these plans more 
concrete in the first half of 1996.  In addition, the cabinet wanted to pass a new law on 
competitiveness based on the advice of the social partners.  Unrest in the public 
sector, especially a strike at the railways, slowed the plan down (article in Res 
Publica).  By now, Prime Minister Dehaene conceded that the pension system for 
employees was evolving into a system that could only deliver a basic benefit in the 
future.  In order to fill the pension gap, employees and employers needed to improve 
supplementary pensions.  The run-up to EMU would provide the government with the 
political capital necessary to secure approval for some but not all of its reform goals. 
The pension reform discussion in 1995/1996 introduced important changes 
into the pension system.  The framework law (kaderwet/ loi de cadre) of July 1996 
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(see below) gave the government significant powers to enact a reform, after several 
years of failed reform attempts.  The main objective of the reform was to reduce long 
term pension expenditure. Civil servant pensions were considered to be one of the 
problems.  In the 1970s the civil service was expanded to fight unemployment, 
creating a large group of future public pensioners.  Due to the rapid growth of public 
sector pension benefits (wage indexed, last five years income) substantial costs were 
forecast for the future.  An attempted reform by the government in 1994 was defeated 
by the municipality lobby (Le Soir, January 5, 1995).  
The background to the pension reform was plans to boost employment and 
reduce the government deficit so that Belgium could qualify for the first stage of 
EMU.  In addition, employers were pleading for reforms that would improve the 
competitive position of Belgian industry while the unions were pushing for 
negotiations about how to boost employment.  In early 1996, the Prime Minister once 
again delayed social security reform by linking it to improving public finances, the 
budget for 1997, and discussions with the social partners about creating jobs.   
In late April, 1996 the four majority parties in the cabinet decided to ask for 
‘special powers’ to be granted for "three large dossiers." (government finances; 
modernization of social security; and the Future Plan for Employment).  The 
government wanted to use program/framework laws in order to avoid direct 
opposition and facilitate decision-making.  The framework laws contained the broad 
outlines of policy, and the details would be specified in royal decrees.  In concrete 
terms the government wanted to pass a framework law that gave them permission to 
take all necessary measures needed in order to reduce the deficit to 3% and to 
guarantee the financial balance of the social security system, including pensions. 
The framework laws would allow the government to pass legislation on the 
1997 budget, employment policy and social security reform, with only "post-factum" 
parliamentary control.  The opposition criticized the government's strategy, to no 
avail, and discussion of the three laws in the lower chamber began on June 12.  By the 
end of July the lower chamber had approved all three framework laws. 
First, the "EMU Law" (De wet van 26 juli 1996 "strekkende tot realisatie van 
de budgettaire voorwaarden tot deelname van Belgie aan de Europese Economische 
en Monetaire Unie;” B.S. August 1, 1996) gave the government until August 31, 1997 
the authority to take a wide range of measures necessary to enable Belgium to join 
EMU.  This included both taxing and spending measures.  The main limitation was 
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that the lowest incomes should be protected and the measures should not conflict with 
the framework law on the modernization of social security. 
Second, the "Social Framework Law" (De wet van 26 juli "tot modernisering 
van de sociale zekerheid en tot vrijwaring van de leefbaarheid van de wettelijke 
pensioenstelsels;” B.S. August 1, 1996) was based explicitly on the coalition 
agreement.  This law's aims were to: maintain the system of social security that 
combines social insurance with solidarity; ensure a durable financial balance in the 
social insurance system; confirm the importance of alternative means of financing in 
order to reduce labor costs; modernize the administration of social insurance; increase 
control and reduce fraud; and to maintain or improve living standards of those with 
minimum benefits.  The law also said that equality between men and women in the 
social security system was a central goal.  The right to the minimum pension was also 
expanded. Under the provisions of the framework law, the cabinet was empowered to 
take any and all decisions it deemed necessary to reach these goals.  
In concrete terms, the law provided for extra revenues for the social insurance 
system from VAT income; at least BEF 104,490 from the VAT revenues would go to 
social insurance.  In addition, the federal subsidies to employee and self-employed 
pension schemes would be improved.  These measures were designed to reduce 
reliance on payroll taxes.   
The role of EMU membership was a crucial factor allowing the government to 
gain passage of social insurance and pension reform.  As the Governor of the Central 
Bank, Fons Verplaetse, put it: "if Belgium misses the train for the European common 
currency, the unity of the country is endangered." (Res Publica, need page number) 
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Budget deficit: reference value: -3.0% of GDP
 1980 1986 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1999 2000 2001 2004* 
Belgium        -0.5 0.1 0.4 (0.2) 0.4 
Spain -2.6 -6.5 -3.5 -3.2 -7.1 -5.9 -6.6 -1.2 -0.8  (-0.9) -0.1 0.1 
Italy -8.5 -11.6 -10.9 -9.5 -9.6 -9.0 -7.5 -1.7 -0.6   (-1.8) -2.6 -2.8 
EU15        -0.7 0.9 (-0.3) -0.9 -2.6 
Euro 
area 
       -1.3 0.1 (-1.0) -1.6 -2.7 
*Figures based on economic forecasting by the Commission, autumn 2003. The exceptional revenue 
from UMTS licences had a significant impact on some Member States' budget deficits in 2000-2002. In 
these cases, the figure between brackets indicates the deficit without this additional revenue.  
 
 
 
Discussion 
 Obviously our four case studies are not a complete test of the model, so our 
results are only suggestive.  The case studies show that our model of domestic 
adaptation to European pressures for change is only moderately successful in 
explaining outcomes.  The two cases of domestic adaptation to the requirements of 
Directice 79/7/EEC broadly confirm our expectations.  The multiple veto points of the 
Belgian political system and the entrenched and influential interests attached to the 
public pension system made policy change difficult and slow.  Only after Belgium 
was hauled into European court on two occasions were the necessary changes made.  
This suggests that even when European adaptational pressures are very strong, 
domestic institutional variables may still impede and/or slow down policy change.  
Our expectation for the Dutch case is broadly confirmed; domestic adaptation was 
correct and punctual, but the processes of negotiating adaptation was fraught with 
difficulties, largely because of potential negative financial consequences for some 
households.  The low number of veto points and the more limited extent of public 
provision in the Netherlands should have facilitated adaptation because the 
preferences of organized interests should not have been as intense as in Belgium and 
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the political system offers fewer veto opportunities.  We find that this explanation 
only explains part of the Dutch story. 
 We argued that our model should be capable of explaining domestic 
adaptation to both strong/direct pressures for change as well as indirect/diffuse 
pressures for change such as those created by the Maastricht budget deficit limit of 
3%.  Our two cases of domestic adaptation to the deficit target demonstrate the limits 
of our model.  In the Belgian case, our model predicts less adaptation than actually 
occurred because the Belgian political system is full of veto points, and the maturity 
and scope of the public pension system mean that organized interests have intense 
preferences about preserving the status quo.  In other words, we should not have seen 
as much pension reform in Belgium.  The Italian case also causes problems for our 
model.  Although not as veto-prone as Belgium, the scope and maturity of the public 
pension system should have made reform more difficult for vote-seeking politicians 
afraid of electoral risks.   
 How do we reconcile these findings with our model?  The obvious answer is 
that the run-up to EMU was an extraordinary episode in the history of European 
integration, and basically the only period in which the EMU constraint is likely to 
substantially influence domestic fiscal policies.  Indeed, the recent weakening of the 
Stability and Growth Pact at the behest of Germany and France confirm this line of 
argument.  This suggests that the reform pressures emanating from EMU in the years 
immediately prior to 1998 are unlikely to be repeated.  To be sure, EMU is still a 
constraint, but it is a shadow of its former self. 
 
Conclusion 
 What do our findings suggest for the study of domestic adaptation to Europe?  
First, we want to emphasize the value of using carefully constructed theoretical 
arguments drawn from the literatures on comparative politicis and public policy to 
explain domestic adaptation to Europe.  If our goal is to understand how national 
governments adapt policies and practices to European requirements, however these 
are defined, it makes sense to start by asking what the existing literatures in specific 
policy fields or areas have to say about change.  For social policy this means looking 
at the welfare state literature; for environmental policy this means drawing on insights 
from existing studies of national environmental policymaking.  It is not clear from the 
existing Europeanization literature that there is any added value in constructing ad hoc 
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explanations for domestic adaptation.  And if national adjustment is basically a 
domestic political game, it makes sense to use our existing models of institutional 
change to explain adaptation to Europe. 
 We think that our analysis demonstrates the utility of drawing on existing 
explanations of policy change, even if our results were not always in line with 
expectations.  We have shown that our model broadly explains the dynamics of 
change in the Belgian and Dutch implementation of Directive 79/7/EEC and is 
partially successful in explaining the Italian and Belgian pension reforms in the run-
up to EMU.   
 Finally, we want to stress the importance of comparing national adaptations to 
different kinds of European pressures.  If our models of domestic adaptation are any 
good, they should be able to explain not just the transposition of directives, but also 
the ways in which member states adapt to the requirements of the Stability and 
Growth Pact, the completion of the internal market, and other types of pressure.
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